Table 2 Situation of infection control and countermeasures against VRE in six hospitals with intra-institutional spread of VRE
From: Interhospital transmission of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium in Aomori, Japan
|  | Hospital A (< 100 beds) | Hospital B (> 400 beds) | Hospital C (> 500 beds) | Hospital D (> 500 beds) | Hospital E (< 200 beds) | Hospital G (< 300 beds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1)Â ICT or Task force for VRE, and rapid reporting to ICT | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No |
(2)Â Rapid laboratory identification of VRE | Delayed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Delayed | Delayed |
(3)Â Rapid and repeated hospital-wide screenings | Only once | Yes | Yes | Yes | Very delayed | Delayed |
(4)Â Cohorting patients with dedicated staff into sections: "VRE patients"; "Contact patients"; and "VRE-free patients" | Only VRE section | Yes | Yes | Only VRE section | Yes, but delayed | Yes, but not dedicated staff |
(5)Â Stopping transfers of VRE patients and contact patients to other units or to any other hospitals | Only VRE patient | Yes, but delayed | Yes | Yes | Yes, but after once negative | Yes |
(6)Â Extended and maintained screening of contact patients already discharged or transferred until the outbreak is controlled | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
(7)Â Flagging of medical records for identifying discharged VRE patients and contact patients in case of readmission | Only VRE patient | Only VRE patient | Only VRE patient | Only VRE patient | Only VRE patient | Only VRE patient |
(8)Â Environmental screening and increased cleaning | Â | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
(9)Â Antimicrobial stewardship | No | Insufficient | Yes | Insufficient | No | No |
(10)Â Information sharing using a local network for infection control (Belong to AICON in 2018) | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |